Against the Turn to Critical Race Theory and "Anti-racism" in Academic Medicine.

Medical academics are increasingly bringing critical race theory (CRT) or its corollaries to their discourse, to their curricula, and to their analyses of health and medical treatment disparities. The author argues that this is an error. The author considers the history of CRT, its claims, and its current presence in the medical literature. He contends that CRT is inimical to usual academic modes of inquiry and has obscured rather than aided the analysis of social and medical treatment disparities. Remedies for racism suggested by CRT advocates will not work and some of them will make things worse. Academic medicine should avoid the embrace of CRT and should maintain an allegiance to rigorous empirical inquiry and to treating patients not as essentialized ethnic group members but as individual human beings in need of care.

Should the risk of Fusobacterium necrophorum pharyngotonsillitis influence prescribing empiric antibiotics for sore throats in adolescents and young adults?

Fusobacterium necrophorum, a gram-negative anaerobe, causes pharyngotonsillitis primarily in adolescents and young adults (approximately 15-30 years old). The same age group has the highest incidence of peritonsillar abscess and the Lemierre syndrome. The same organism, F. necrophorum, is the most common cause of peritonsillar abscess in this age group and causes at least 80% of Lemierre syndrome cases. We outline the case for empiric antibiotic treatment of some patient in this age group who have a significant probability that F. necrophorum is the cause of their pharyngotonsillitis.

What does the character of medicine as a social practice imply for professional conscientious objection?

The dispute over professional conscientious objection presumes a picture of medicine as a practice governed by rules. This rule-based conception of medical practice is identifiable with John Rawls's conception of social practices. This conception does not capture the character of medical practice as experienced by practitioners, for whom it is a sensibility or "form of life" rather than rules. Moreover, the sensibility of medical practice as experienced by physicians is at best neutral, and at worst hostile, to the demands of those who would override physician conscientious objection to the provision of currently contested services. That being so, calls for overriding physician conscientious objection are much more demanding of the medical profession than they appear in light of Rawls's view. As such overriding may entail the forcible transformation of medicine's form of life, the author contends that it would be more prudent to provide contested services by circumventing the medical profession than by compelling it.

Putting Patient Autonomy in its Proper Place; Professional Norm-Guided Medical Decision-Making.

The recommended model for patient participation in medical decision-making is the shared decision-making model (SDM). That model is ambiguous as to how much physician influence on patient decision-making is desirable or permissible. Most discussants suggest that physician influence on medical decisions, while allowable, should be limited. Empirical studies of medical decision-making have shown that much medical practice does not conform to the SDM. The author recommends a different model for medical decision-making, "professional norm-guided medical decision-making," which, he suggests, much medical practice actually follows. This model does not defer to patient autonomy to the extent usually recommended by the SDM and permits a greater degree of physician influence on patient medical decisions than usual versions of that model. Having described the working of the the professional norm-guided decision-making model, the author specifies the form of patient autonomy respected by it and offers a case for preferring this model of medical decision-making to the SDM.

Health care institutions should not exclude smokers from employment.

Some health care institutions, including academic health centers, have adopted policies excluding smokers from employment. Claims advanced on behalf of these policies include financial savings from reduced health costs and absenteeism as well as advantages consonant with their message of healthy living. The authors suggest that the institutional savings from these policies are speculative and unproven. Also, in settings where large medical schools operate, it is likely to be the poor, including members of minority groups, who, under an employee smoker ban, will lose the opportunity to work for an employer that offers health insurance and other benefits. In response to the incentives created by such bans, some will quit smoking, but most will not. Thus, at the community level, employee smoker bans are more likely to be harmful than beneficial.Although private businesses may rightly choose not to hire smokers in the 19 states where such policies are legal, health care institutions, including academic health centers, should consider hiring choices in light of the values they profess. The traditional values of medicine include service to all persons in need, even when illness results from addiction or unsafe behavior. Secular academic communities require a shared dedication to discovery without requiring strict conformity of private behavior or belief. The authors conclude that for health care institutions, policies of hiring smokers and helping them to quit are both prudent and expressive of the norms of medical care, such as inclusion, compassion, and fellowship, that academic health professionals seek to honor.

The limits of social justice as an aspect of medical professionalism.

Contemporary accounts of medical ethics and professionalism emphasize the importance of social justice as an ideal for physicians. This ideal is often specified as a commitment to attaining the universal availability of some level of health care, if not of other elements of a "decent minimum" standard of living. I observe that physicians, in general, have not accepted the importance of social justice for professional ethics, and I further argue that social justice does not belong among professional norms. Social justice is a norm of civic rather than professional life; professional groups may demand that their members conform to the requirements of citizenship but ought not to require civic virtues such as social justice. Nor should any such requirements foreclose reasonable disagreement as to the content of civic norms, as requiring adherence to common specifications of social justice would do. Demands for any given form of social justice among physicians are unlikely to bear fruit as medical education is powerless to produce this virtue.

Moral fiction or moral fact? The distinction between doing and allowing in medical ethics.

Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as in the grip of 'moral fictions'. The author contends that such a diagnosis is too hasty. The possibility of a moral distinction between active euthanasia and allowing-to-die has not been closed off by the argumentative strategies employed by these PAS advocates, including the contrasting cases strategy and the assimilation of doing and allowing to a common sense notion of causation. The philosophical debate over the doing/allowing distinction remains inconclusive, but physicians and others who rely upon that distinction in thinking about the ethics of end-of-life care need not give up on it in response to these arguments.

Pacemaker deactivation: withdrawal of support or active ending of life?

In spite of ethical analyses assimilating the palliative deactivation of pacemakers to commonly accepted withdrawings of life-sustaining therapy, many clinicians remain ethically uncomfortable with pacemaker deactivation at the end of life. Various reasons have been posited for this discomfort. Some cardiologists have suggested that reluctance to deactivate pacemakers may stem from a sense that the pacemaker has become part of the patient's "self." The authors suggest that Daniel Sulmasy is correct to contend that any such identification of the pacemaker is misguided. The authors argue that clinicians uncomfortable with pacemaker deactivation are nevertheless correct to see it as incompatible with the traditional medical ethics of withdrawal of support. Traditional medical ethics is presently taken by many to sanction pacemaker deactivation when such deactivation honors the patient's right to refuse treatment. The authors suggest that the right to refuse treatment applies to treatments involving ongoing physician agency. This right cannot underwrite patient demands that physicians reverse the effects of treatments previously administered, in which ongoing physician agency is no longer implicated. The permanently indwelling pacemaker is best seen as such a treatment. As such, its deactivation in the pacemaker-dependent patient is best seen not as withdrawal of support but as active ending of life. That being the case, clinicians adhering to the usual ethical analysis of withdrawal of support are correct to be uncomfortable with pacemaker deactivation at the end of life.

Retainer medicine: an ethically legitimate form of practice that can improve primary care.

Retainer medicine has become an important yet controversial form of primary care practice in the United States, coming under attack for its purported failure to measure up to professional ethics. Critics opine that retainer medicine obstructs professional commitments to health care access and social justice. Some ethicists urge that society should restrict or ban retainer medicine; professional organizations have yet to take a stand. The authors believe that retainer medicine is compatible with professional ethics and will more likely aid in solving the difficulties facing primary care rather than add to them. Although professional ethics should evolve to address new conditions, a condemnation of retainer medicine is warranted neither by traditional ethical precepts nor by contemporary developments in medical ethics. Any move to sanction retainer medicine under the banner of professionalism or professional ethics will be counterproductive. The primary care shortage will only get worse if physicians in retainer practice leave primary care altogether, a likely outcome of legal or professional condemnation of retainer practice.

Perspective: Medical professionalism and medical education should not involve commitments to political advocacy.

It is increasingly suggested that political advocacy is a core professional responsibility for physicians. The author argues that this is an error. Advocacy on behalf of societal goals, even those goals as unexceptionable as the betterment of human health, is inevitably political. Claims that political advocacy are a professional responsibility are mistaken, the author argues, because (1) civic virtues are outside the professional realm, (2) even if civic virtues were professionally obligatory, it is unclear that civic participation is necessary for such virtue, and (3) the profession of medicine ought not to require any particular political stance of its members. Claims that academic health centers should systematically foster advocacy are also deeply problematic. Although advocacy may coexist alongside the core university activities of research and education, insofar as it infects those activities, advocacy is likely to subvert them, as advocacy seeks change rather than knowledge. And official efforts on behalf of advocacy will undermine university aspirations to objectivity and neutrality.American society has conferred remarkable success and prosperity on its medical profession. Physicians are deserving of such success only insofar as they succeed in offering society excellence and dedication in professional work. Mandatory professional advocacy must displace such work but cannot substitute for it. The medical profession should steadfastly resist attempts to add advocacy to its essential professional commitments.